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The causal status  of fitness  and natural selection is  increasingly called into doubt in the 
philosophical literature. For example, Elliott Sober argues  that the fitness  of individual 
organisms  is  holistic; i.e., it is  dependent on causally independent factors  like census  size. 
Others  have argued that fitness differences  cannot properly be causes  of evolutionary 
change. In this  paper I directly challenge the holistic conclusion, and thereby shed light 
on the debates over the causal status  of fitness. I show that the causalists and statisticalists 
are—to a large degree—arguing past each other. There is  a plurality of fitness  concepts; 
some are legitimately causal, while others seem to be based, at least in part, on purely 
statistical parameters. But such facts  say nothing about whether fitness  in general is  causal 
or statistical. 
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1. Introduction
Biological fitness  is  a foundational concept in the theory of natural selection. Natural selection is  often 
defined in terms of fitness differences  as  “any consistent difference in fitness (i.e., survival and reproduction) among 
phenotypically different biological entities” (Futuyma 1998, 349). And in Lewontin’s  (1970) classic articulation of 
the theory of natural selection, he lists  fitness  differences  as one of the necessary conditions for evolution by 
natural selection to occur. Despite this foundational position of fitness, there remains  much debate over the 
nature of fitness, especially whether fitness  differences  can truly be said to cause evolutionary change. In 
recent years these debates  have crystalized into two camps: (1) causalists, who see fitness  differences as  being 
one of the causes  of evolutionary change, and (2) statisticalists, who deny the causal efficacy of fitness  and 
instead hold that “fitness is a mere statistical, noncausal property of  trait types” (Walsh 2010, 148).
The statisticalist/causalist debates  do not represent a unified front, but instead constitute a diverse array 
of arguments. Some have argued that selection is  a force (e.g., Sober 1984), while others  have challenged the 
force metaphor (Matthen and Ariew 2002). Some have suggested that the causal conception of fitness  is 
qualitative, not quantitative (Matthen and Ariew 2002), or that if quantified, it provides the wrong results 
(Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew 2002). And some have placed the causal nexus of selection at the individual level 
(Bouchard and Rosenberg 2004), while others place it at the population level (Millstein 2006). 
The chief position that I will articulate and challenge below is  put forward by Sober (2001) in one of the 
most important philosophical papers on fitness. The conclusion that Sober draws  is  that the fitness  of an 
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individual organism is dependent on features  of its  population that are causally independent of the 
organism’s  reproductive outcomes. Although Sober is  not in the statisticalist camp, his  conclusion, as  we will 
see, seems to cause trouble for the causalist. Because of its  dependence on the whole population, Sober 
describes fitness as being “holistic” (320). I will follow Sober in labeling this position “fitness holism.” 
In what follows, I critique fitness  holism and then use the framework developed in this  critique to draw 
out some broader implications  for the causalist-statisticalist debates. My critique will be based on a crucial 
premise that has  been accepted by some philosophers, but whose consequences have not been fully 
appreciated in debates over the causal nature of  evolutionary theory: 
(P1) the fitness  of a trait is  not, in general, both the average fitness of individuals  bearing the trait and a 
predictor of  trait dynamics
Before beginning my critique of holism, I need to make some preliminary distinctions  and lend support to 
P1. 
2. Some Preliminaries  
In order to say something meaningful about whether fitness  is  holistic, and whether it can be a cause of 
evolutionary change, it will be necessary to say something more general about the nature of fitness. To 
answer a question about the causal status  of fitness  we need to have some grasp on what fitness is. The 
difficulty here is  that there are numerous  debates—and numerous  positions within these debates—that are 
on, or are related to, fitness. My task in this  section is to show which of these debates can be set aside for 
present purposes, and which distinctions must be made for the debates that I will engage.
One debate in the philosophy of biology concerns the level—genes, organisms, populations, species, etc.
—at which selection operates. Debates  range from monisms  (claiming, for example, that all selection is 
genic), to pluralisms  (holding that there are multiple, equivalent ways of describing selection), to a 
hierarchical view holding that selection acts  at one or more level simultaneously and that there is  a fact of 
the matter which level is  undergoing selection at any given time (see Okasha 2006 for a primer on these 
positions). These debates  are related to discussions  of fitness, since a claim that selection is  operating at a 
particular level is  (for some, at least) a claim that an entity at that level is  a fitness-bearing entity. In what 
follows, I will remain as  neutral as  possible about these debates. Although I restrict my discussion to the 
fitness  of organisms  and their traits, this  should not be read as  a claim that these are the only legitimate 
fitness-bearing entities. Instead, I hope that the arguments about fitness here can be applied to all fitness-
bearing entities, whether they be genes, populations, or entire species.
But given that trait and individual fitness  will be the central fitness  concepts  discussed below, a few words 
of clarification are needed. I defer discussion of the fitness  of individual organisms to Section 2 when 
discussing the propensity interpretation of fitness. Here I focus on the fitness  of traits. The difficulty with 
trait fitness  is  that there are multiple internally consistent, yet incompatible, ways  that it is  commonly 
understood.
If one were interested in determining the fitness of a trait, it would seem sensible to record the fitness 
values  of all of the individuals bearing that trait and take an average of these quantities. It is  perhaps  for this 
reason that philosophers  generally understand trait fitness to be nothing but this  average. Mills  and Beatty 
(1979) define the fitness  of types  as  “the average [individual fitness] of the members of each of the types 
under consideration” (276). And Sober holds  that “the fitness  value of a trait is  the average of the fitness 
values  of the individuals  that have the trait” (2001, 310). Biologists  also commonly understand fitness  in this 
way: “[trait] fitness is  the mean survival or reproductive success  of all individuals  having the same 
phenotype” (Schluter and Nychka 1994, 598).
Although average individual fitness  might in some cases  be a good estimate of the fitness  of a trait, a 
definition of the fitness  of a trait as  the average of the fitnesses  of individuals  bearing the trait can lead to 
problems  if one also expects trait fitness  to be a good predictor of evolutionary dynamics. To see this, 
consider a more complete range of what ‘trait fitness’ might mean. The three main ways  of understanding 
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trait fitness  are: (T1) the fitness  impact (on individuals) of the trait; (T2) the average fitness  values  of 
individuals  possessing the trait; or (T3) the tendency of the trait to spread through the population. T1 is 
often an implicit assumption about trait fitness  and is rarely explicitly stated, unlike T2, which, as  quoted in 
the previous paragraph, is  how trait fitness  is  often defined. T3 also is  an explicitly defined understanding of 
trait fitness  from the field of population genetics. Kimura and Crow (1970), for example, note that the 
number of individuals  in the next generation (of a discrete model with non-overlapping generations) may be 
computed by the equation:
(2.1)	 Nt = wNt-1
They go on to say that “[w]e regard w as  a measure of both survival and reproduction […] We call w the 
Darwinian fitness, or simply the fitness” (5). Equation (2.1) clearly links  fitness  directly to population 
dynamics, as suggested by T3.
It can be seen easily that these three notions  of trait fitness are not equivalent and, furthermore, that one 
cannot infer high or low trait fitness in one of these senses  from high or low values  in the others. Consider 
first the relationship between T2 and T3. If a trait is  passed on with less than perfect fidelity, the fitness  of 
the trait sensu T3 can be lower than the average of the fitnesses of individuals  bearing the trait (i.e., T2). 
Similarly, if the trait can be passed on to (or induced in) others  in the population through non-genetic 
means, then the trait fitness  sensu T3 could have a higher value than the average fitness  of the individuals. 
The lack of equivalence of T2 and T3  shows that trait fitness  cannot be equivalent to both. It is for this 
reason that P1 (the fitness  of a trait is  not, in general, both the average fitness of individuals  bearing the trait 
and a predictor of trait dynamics) is  indeed true. Although T2 and T3 are coherent concepts, their lack of 
equivalence implies  P1. There is  thus  not a single concept of trait fitness  that can be both T2 and T3 
simultaneously.
More subtly, the value of T2 is  obtained by reducing the diversity of individual fitness values  in a 
population to a single scalar quantity, and it does  so via the arithmetic mean. It is  not clear if one is 
attempting to obtain a value that maximally predicts  population dynamics  that one should choose the 
arithmetic mean. If we consider the distribution in the fitness values  of the individuals  bearing the trait, the 
evolutionary dynamics  are going to be a function of various properties of this  distribution, such as  its 
variance and skew, to which the arithmetic mean is  not sensitive. Other statistics on individual fitness  values 
may be better predictors  of population dynamics, such as the geometric mean (Lewontin and Cohen 1969). 
Thus, one could support the claim that trait fitness  is  a mathematical function of individual fitness  values 
without holding that this function is an arithmetic mean.
The relationship between T1 and T2 depends on how we understand the vague concept of the “fitness 
impact of the trait.” If we take T1  to be the counterfactual difference in the fitness of a particular individual 
with and without the trait, then this concept will be clear and unambiguous. But the problem with 
identifying T1 and T2, then, is  that traits  will not always  have homogeneous  effects  on an individual’s  fitness. 
If a trait doubles  the number of offspring for half of the population but kills  the other half at birth, then 
fitness  sensu T2 will be no different from the T2 fitness  of a neutral trait. Thus, the impact of a trait on 
individuals—fitness  sensu T1—can change in the face of invariant T2 fitness. (Incidentally, T2 will not be 
equivalent to T3 for such a case either.) The distinction between these ways of understanding trait fitness  will 
play an important role in what follows. With this  in hand, we are now prepared to analyze the argument for 
holism.
3. Fitness Holism  
Sober (2001) concludes  that fitness  is  a “holistic” quantity that, “reflects  a property of the containing 
population—namely, its census  size—that may have no effect on the organism’s  reproductive 
behavior” (320).1 If this  is  true, one of two conclusions should be drawn: (a) individual fitness  differences 
cause evolutionary change (via differences  in reproductive outcomes) despite the fact that these fitness 
differences are at times  entirely due to factors  that have no causal influence on the reproductive outcomes  of 
RAMSEY — FITNESS DIFFERENCES 4
OPEN ACCESS - Freely Available at philosophyandtheoryinbiology.org
fitness-bearing individuals;2 or, (b) fitness  differences  are not in fact a cause of evolution. Neither of these 
conclusions  are attractive—the former is  uncanny and the latter is  nihilistic—and they should not be 
accepted without an airtight argument backing them up. The argument offered by Sober for holistic fitness 
is  flawed, but it is  flawed in a very interesting and important way: it is  implicitly based on the denial of P1. 
Before showing that the holism argument assumes  that it is  false, let’s  examine in more detail Sober’s 
argument and the account of  fitness that he is challenging.
The main way that philosophers  have understood and articulated the causal account of fitness  is  what is 
known as  the “propensity interpretation of fitness” (Brandon 1978; Mills  and Beatty 1979). The propensity 
interpretation of fitness  (henceforth PIF) holds that fitness  is  a probabilistic propensity to produce offspring 
and that this  propensity is  one of the causes  of evolutionary outcomes. The PIF was introduced because of 
two considerations. First, fitness  cannot be identified with any particular kind of trait like fleetness  or 
massiveness, since for one organism being fleeter or more massive may be advantageous, while for others  it 
may be disadvantageous. Second, organisms  with equivalent fitness  values  do not always  have identical 
reproductive fates—a high or low fitness  is  no guarantee of high or low reproductive success. This second 
point is  important because if fitness were identified with actual reproductive outcomes, there would be no 
sense in which fitness  could causally explain these outcomes, and fitness  would thus  not be part of the causes 
of evolutionary change. The propensity interpretation of fitness  takes fitness  to be based on a distribution of 
potential outcomes, not on actual outcomes.
If fitness is  based on a distribution of potential outcomes instead of actual outcomes, this  distribution 
has  a number of important qualities. One of these qualities  is  the distribution’s  variance. Populations  can 
(and generally do) include conspecifics  of different types that differ in the variance in their distribution of 
potential reproductive outcomes. This  variance within a generation in potential reproductive outcomes  is 
labeled “within generation variance” and it is  this  variance that leads  Sober to the conclusion that fitness  is 
holistic. The holistic conclusion comes from a reflection on the way in which variance influences  fitness. 
Sober draws on the work of biologist John Gillespie who, in a 1974 paper, argued for the following claim: if 
there is  within-generation variance in offspring number, then the fitness  of a trait (ω) is  a function of 
properties of the distribution in reproductive success—the arithmetic mean of the distribution (μ) and the 
distribution’s variance (σ2)—as well as the population size (n). In particular, he proposed that
(2.2) ωi = μi - σ2i/n
This equation implies  that fitness decreases  with increasing variance. But this  variance matters  less  as the 
population increases  in size. As  the population size approaches  infinity, the effect of variance will vanish. But 
for any finite (i.e., real) population, the fitness of  a trait will be a function of  population size.
The dependence of fitness  on population size is  how Sober is  able to derive his  radical conclusion that 
the fitness  of individual organisms  is  a function of the existence of other individuals, even if these 
individuals  are causally independent of one another. For example, consider a population containing two 
members  each of two types  of individuals, A and C. As  Sober argues, “The two A’s  and two C’s  in my 
example might be four cows standing in the four corners  of a large pasture; the two A’s  have two calves each, 
whereas  each of the C’s  flips  a coin to decide whether she will have one calf or three. The cows  are causally 
isolated from each other, but the fitnesses  of the two strategies  reflect population size” (2001, 316). Sober’s 
conclusion is  that the fitness  of each of these individuals  is  a function of how many others  there are in the 
population (n), regardless  of whether they causally interact with one another—individual fitness  is  thus 
holistic.
We should pause to consider and reject a quick way of dismissing Sober’s  argument. His  argument, it 
might seem, is  a nonstarter because is  has  an unrealistic assumption about population structure. That is, 
Sober makes  two seemingly incompatible statements: (1) A and C individuals  are in the same population; 
and, (2) A and C individuals do not causally interact. If one takes  a population to be a collection of causally 
interacting conspecifics, then A and C individuals  are either causally interacting population members, or 
they are not in the same population. Sober’s  conclusion should be rejected because it is  based on 
incompatible premises.
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This rejection of Sober, however, is  too fast and misses  his  point. His  unrealistic assumptions  about the 
nature of populations are not necessary for his  argument to work. It could be that A and C individuals  do 
interact in some fitness-affecting ways. It is  nevertheless  true that the number of individuals  in the 
population is  a component of the fitness of their traits  (assuming a T3 conception of trait fitness). Sober’s 
toy example was  crafted to provide an example of fitness  differences  being entirely due to n. But one could 
easily provide a more realistic example in which fitness is  still affected by changes  in n even though changes 
in n correspond with other changes as well. 
For example, if we hold a more realistic premise that the individuals  in the population interact, then an 
increase in the number of individuals will modify such things  as  the frequency of mating opportunities  and 
the degree of competition over key environmental resources  (e.g., food). Such changes  are surely the sort of 
thing that can change the fitness of the organism’s  traits. But, even if increasing n has  these effects, it is 
nevertheless  true that the increase in n still has  an effect on trait fitness  in and of itself, independently of 
these other effects. That is, it is  still true that the effect of variance on trait fitness  changes  with n even if 
changes in n track other trait fitness  component changes  as  well. Therefore, the unrealistic nature of Sober’s 
toy argument is not its downfall.
With this  caveat, it appears  that Sober’s  argument is  convincing. If it were sound, then it would have 
profound implications  for how we understand the causal structure of natural selection. But the argument is 
not sound because it relies  on a false premise about the relationship between the fitness  of a trait (or type) 
and the fitness  of individuals  bearing that trait (or being of that type). The two key premises  that Sober uses 
in his argument for holism are: (H1) the fitness  of a trait is, in some instances, a function of population size; 
and, (H2) some individuals  in a population bearing a particular trait may not have any causal interaction 
with other individuals  in the population bearing that trait. I will not contest the truth of these premises  (with 
the above caveat regarding H2). The conclusion that he is  drawing—an individual’s  fitness  is  a function of 
some properties that have no causal effect on that individual—seems to follow easily from the premises. But 
notice that H1 is  about traits, whereas  H2 and the conclusion are about individual organisms. For the argument 
to go through, trait fitness  values  must be a direct function of individual fitness  values. But as  I will now 
argue, if  trait fitness is supposed to be tied to trait dynamics, no such function exists.
Recall the distinction made above between the various concepts  of trait fitness. Given that T1– T3 are 
not equivalent, which of these notions  of fitness  is  at play in the argument for holism? The problem is  that 
the holism argument is  employing both T2 and T3 without noting that they are not equivalent. Sober 
explicitly endorses  T2 and for this  reason holds  that one can move between trait and individual fitness  in an 
unproblematic way, allowing the holistic conclusion to follow from H1 and H2. But he is  also taking trait 
fitness  to be T3. For example, he says that, “[t]he fitness  values  of traits, along with the number of 
individuals  initially possessing each trait, are supposed to entail the expected frequencies  of the traits one or 
more generations in the future (if  selection is the only force influencing evolutionary change)” (2001, 317). 
To see how the holistic conclusion appears  to follow, consider again Sober’s  example of four cows  in a 
field, two each of A and C types. Let’s flesh out this example and say that the offspring of an A is  always an 
A and that the offspring of a C is  always  a C. Now let’s  say that each A has a probability of 0.5 of having 
zero offspring and a probability of 0.5 of having two offspring. Type C individuals  have a probability of 1.0 
of having one offspring.3 What happens  to the fitness of the traits  of being an A or a C if the population 
doubles? In other words, what happens  to the expected proportions  of A and C when we change the 
population size? In a population of one A and one C individual, the expected A:C trait frequency in the 
next generation is  1:2.4 If we double the number of A and C individuals, the ratio changes  to 1:1.4. If we 
continue to increase population size, the ratio will approach the limit of 1:1. This  is  not controversial and is 
a direct consequence of within-generation variance in potential reproductive output. It is  in this  sense that 
trait fitness depends on n.
To achieve the holistic conclusion, one needs to show that individual fitness  also depends  on n. The ω in 
equation (2.2) is  clearly trait fitness, and this is  how both Gillespie (1974) and Sober (2001) interpret it. What 
argument can be made for this  equation also applying to the fitness  of individuals? One argument would be 
that trait fitness must be a direct consequence of individual fitness and nothing else, and that because n 
modulates trait fitness, it must also modulate individual fitness. But such an assertion would be question-
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begging if there were not stronger, independent reasons  for linking n and individual fitness. A possible 
argument could be that we want individual fitness  to be maximally predictive of trait dynamics. This is 
tantamount to arguing that we want individual fitness  to maximally track T3 values. But recall that there is 
already a rift between T2 and T3. Thus, there also will be a rift between individual fitness  and T3: features 
like imperfect trait transmission change trait fitness  T3 without changing individual fitness. This  shows  that 
we need idealizations  like perfect trait transmission to get from individual fitness to T3. Similarly, another 
idealization that is  needed to link individual fitness  with trait dynamics is  a large population size: trait fitness 
T2 is  equivalent to T3 only if the population size is  infinite, though finite but large populations  can bring 
about a tight correlation between T2 and T3. Population size, like the imperfect transmission of traits, is  just 
one of the factors  that complicates  trait dynamics. It should thus  be regarded in the same way as  imperfect 
trait transmission, i.e., a factor independent of individual fitness  but important for—and can cause 
predictable, directional changes  in—trait dynamics. That is, if the heritability of a trait is  not included in 
individual fitness, then, a fortiori, population size should not be included either.5 
To support this  argument, consider a coin flipping analogy in which there are two kinds of coins, A 
coins  and C coins. A game can be played with the coins  in which some number of A and C coins are flipped 
once per round during each of a series  of rounds. At the end of each round, the coins are removed and the 
player is  paid back (with A and C coins) based on the outcomes  of the coin flips. The game begins with an 
equal number of A and C coins  and the coins are repeatedly flipped until the ratio of A:C meets  or falls 
below 1:2. Now consider the question of how many rounds  are expected to occur in the game. In order to 
answer this question, there are four crucial facts  that we need to know: (i) the probability of the coins landing 
on each side; (ii) the standard paybacks from the results  of each flip; (iii) the probability (and kind) of 
payback errors; and (iv) the starting number of coins. Which of these four are elements  of the fitness  of 
individual coins  and which are part of the fitness of the A and C traits? Applying his  stance on organismic 
fitness, Sober’s  answer would be that (i), (ii), and (iv) are part of both individual and trait fitness,6 but that (iii) 
is  part of neither. What is  the justification for excluding (iii) but not (iv) from individual fitness? By excluding 
(iii), we are giving up on accurate predictions  of trait dynamics  and such predictions  cannot therefore be the 
reason for including (iv) in individual fitness. Instead, I suggest that individual fitness  includes  (i) and (ii) only, 
and that predicting trait dynamics  requires  the addition of factors  outside of individual fitness, in this case 
(iii)  and (iv). Support for this  way of understanding individual fitness  is  that by including only (i) and (ii), it 
fulfills  key desiderata of individual fitness: being distinct from inheritance, being a function of properties of 
(and only of) the individual and its local environment, and helping to predict future trait dynamics. Because 
of this, there is  a burden of proof for the holist to support the inclusion of (iv) in individual fitness. Although 
there is  good reason to support the inclusion of (iv) in T3, it is  question-begging to simply assume that 
individual fitness  also includes  (iv). And not only is  this  assumption unwarranted, it is also troubling. As 
Sober himself points out, the holistic conclusion is radical and quite mysterious—individual organisms  have 
fitness  values  that are based on a feature (n) causally independent of their reproductive outcomes. This  is  like 
arguing that the fitness of a particular A or C coin is  a function of how many coins  have been (or are going 
to be) flipped, and is  therefore “holistic.” We should instead just sidestep the holistic conclusion (and the 
problems  entailed by it) by considering the fitness  of A and C coins  to be a function of (i) and (ii) only, and 
that questions about the expected ratios  of A:C are answered only by considering additional information, 
such as (iii) and (iv).
If T1–T3 are non-equivalent, and if therefore trait fitness  values  are not (always) a direct function of 
individual fitness  values, we can now see how the argument for holism fails. Recall the premises: (H1)  the 
fitness  of a trait is, in some instances, a function of population size; and, (H2) some individuals  in a 
population bearing a particular trait may not have any causal interaction with other individuals  in the 
population bearing that trait. It is  now clear that in spite of the truth of these premises, the conclusion that 
Sober is  drawing—“an organism’s  fitness  is  not a propensity that it has” (320)—does  not follow any more 
than the analogous conclusion that because the probability of achieving an A:C ratio of 0.5 in 100 rounds 
varies  with the number of coins  flipped, the fitness  of an individual coin is based on causally independent 
factors (like the number of  coins being flipped). 
The argument for holism takes  predictions  about the future proportion of a trait in a population, 
considers  this  to be trait fitness, assumes  that trait fitness  is  both an average of individual fitness  values  and a 
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predictor of future trait proportions (both T2 and T3), and draws the conclusion that individual fitness  is 
holistic. Add P1, which denies this  assumption, and the chain of reasoning breaks; with the chain of 
reasoning broken, individual fitness  is  saved from holism, as  is  PIF. What are the implications  of the these 
conclusions and distinctions for the causalist-statisticalist debates?   
4. Broader Implications for the Causalist-Statisticalist Debates   
Over the last decade, a series  of papers  has  been published in support of one or more of the following 
related claims:  (1) selection is  not a cause of evolution, (2) fitness  is  not a cause of evolution, or (3) drift is  not 
a cause of evolution (e.g., Matthen and Ariew 2002, 2009; Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew 2002; Ariew and Ernst 
2009; Pigliucci and Kaplan 2006; Walsh 2007, 2010). Although it is  possible to argue for one of (1)–(3) 
without holding all of these positions (and some of the statisticalist papers just cited focus  on only a subset of 
them), they generally come as  a package. If, for example, one asserts  (1) and also holds that natural selection 
operates  through (or is  explained by) fitness  differences, then one must also hold (2). Thus, a position that 
these papers  explicitly stake out (or tacitly imply) is  that fitness  should be understood as  a statistic, as  the rate 
of change over time in the representation of a trait in a population.7 This  notion of fitness  is known as 
Fisherian fitness  after Ronald Fisher, who dubbed this  growth rate statistic the Malthusian parameter (Fisher 
1930). In what follows I will label the statistical interpretation of  fitness SI and the causal interpretation CI.
The SI is  a hard pill to swallow—accepting it means  giving up on causal explanations  of evolutionary 
change due to fitness  differences  since, under the statisticalist framework, “fitness  is  a mere statistical, 
noncausal property of trait types” (Walsh 2010, 148). Like the holism position, the SI should not be accepted 
without an airtight argument backing it up. Therefore, it is  important to explore the question of whether the 
above arguments and distinctions  undercut or support the SI. To narrow the scope of this  exploration, I will 
focus  on two papers supporting the SI: one of the founding papers  in the SI camp, Matthen and Ariew 
(2002), as well as  a more recent paper by Ariew and Ernst (2009). Any critique of the positions  in these 
papers  thus  does  not constitute a comprehensive attack on the statisticalist position, but does nevertheless 
call into question some of  the core argumentative strategies of  the statisticalists. 
4.1 Three Desiderata We Should Not Desire
Ariew and Ernst (henceforth, A&E) “identify three desiderata for an account of fitness  that propensity 
theorists  accept” (2009, 289). They then form a modus tollens argument against the PIF: if the PIF is  correct, 
then the PIF must meet the desiderata. The PIF cannot meet the desiderata. Therefore, the PIF is  not the 
correct account of fitness. I will argue that the desiderata are not ones  that we should expect the PIF to 
meet, and therefore the first premise is  false. I begin my critique with their third desideratum and work 
backwards. 
A&E’s third desideratum is: “(C) The fitness  of a trait must be a function of the properties  of the 
individual members  of the population within their local environmental conditions” (291). Interestingly, this 
is  tantamount to saying that trait fitness  cannot be holistic. They justify the inclusion of this  desideratum by 
claiming that “because the fitness  of a trait is  simply the fitness of individuals  with that trait, we are also 
guaranteed that condition (C) is  satisfied” (292). Their argument thus  takes  the premises  that individual 
fitness  is  local, and that trait fitness  is  a function of individual fitness  values, and draws  the conclusion that 
trait fitness must also be local. The problem, however, is  that the notion of trait fitness  that A&E are arguing 
for is  that of T3. And the argument against individual fitness  holism shows  that trait fitness, if it is  to be 
predictive of trait dynamics (as suggested in A&E’s  desideratum A below), must include factors external to 
individual fitness. And one of these factors  is  population size. Because population size is  (or can be) “non-
local,” trait fitness  sensu T3 can be non-local. It would be strange if individual fitness  were similarly non-
local. But, as we saw above, worries about the non-locality and holism for organismic fitness can be set aside.
Thus, if the “function” referred to in (C) is  anything like the arithmetic mean employed in T2, then this 
is  clearly not a desideratum for the PIF. If instead, the point is  merely that trait fitness  values must be 
derivable from the properties  of individuals  bearing the traits  as  well as  their environmental contexts, then it 
is  clearly (though trivially) a desideratum. This is  true because if we include features  like population size and 
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structure, we can enumerate all of the ingredients  that go into T3. It seems, however, that this  trivial 
interpretation of “function” is  not what A&E are getting at in (C). If not, then this  desideratum is  clearly not 
one that “propensity theorists accept.”
Now consider desideratum (B): “[An individual] fitness concept must enable us  to compare the degree to 
which natural selection will favor the spread of one trait over another, alternative trait” (290). We can again 
see here the leap from individual to trait fitness  T3—individual fitness, they are asserting, is  supposed to give 
us  predictions  about trait dynamics. But individual fitness  merely provides  us  with predictions  about what 
will happen to individuals. Whether or not a trait will spread through the population is  quite another matter. 
Having the trait find itself in fitter individuals  at a disproportionately high frequency will help the trait 
spread, but will not guarantee its  spread and, furthermore, such a trait is  not necessarily fitter than another 
trait that is  associated with less  fit individuals  (since the trait associated with the less  fit could be passed on 
with higher fidelity, for example). The trait of “having disease X” could have a high fitness  sensu T3 in spite 
of the fact that the disease affects  only the least fit in the population. A&E justify (B) by claiming that “[b]
ecause the propensity interpretation equates  the fitness  of an organism with a particular number that can be 
greater or lower than another, every trait’s  fitness can be compared with others, satisfying condition 
(B)” (292). The above discussion clearly shows  that while it might be true that one organism’s fitness  can be 
compared to another, and that the fitness of alternate traits  can be compared, it does  not follow that we can 
derive trait dynamics—or T3—from individual fitness alone. Thus, (B) cannot be a desideratum for the PIF.
Finally, consider desideratum (A): “[An individual] fitness concept must be able to explain why one trait 
is  expected to be better represented in a population under the influence of natural selection” (290). We could 
read “be able to explain” as  “help to explain” or “suffice to explain.” If it is  the former, then this  is  a 
desideratum of the PIF. But under this  reading the fact that observations will often deviate significantly from 
predictions  if ancillary data like heritability values  are not used does not serve as  a counterexample to the 
PIF. If instead we read it as  “suffice to explain,” then we can easily see that P1  and the discussion in Section 
2 shows us that this is not a desideratum. Again, individual fitness values alone do not give us trait dynamics.
By showing that these desiderata are not ones that a PIF proponent should hold, is  the PIF, and 
therefore the causal conception of fitness, thereby supported? Instead of reading my critique of A&E as  a 
critique of statisticalism and a support of causalism, I want to make it clear that things  are a bit more 
complex. In fact, P1 might appear to be a statisticalist, and not a causalist, premise. But as I suggest below 
(Section 5), the causalists  and statisticalists  are each correct about a particular conception of fitness. T3 is 
modulated by n, but this  does not mean that the PIF is not causal. Similarly, the coherence of a causal 
conception of individual fitness  does  not undermine the fact that particular renderings  of trait fitness  can 
have non-causal dependencies. Before we move to this  larger discussion, let’s  examine another of the 
statisticalist arguments.
4.2 The Vices of  Vectors
If selection can be understood properly as  an evolutionary force, as  Sober (1984) classically argued, then 
there is  good reason to think that it can also be understood as  a cause of evolutionary change. Thus, one 
strategy for undermining the causal efficacy of selection/fitness  is  to show that the force metaphor breaks 
down. Such an argument would by no means  be a definitive argument against the causalist position, but will 
serve to constrain the resources of the causalists, pressing them to provide alternative, force-free 
conceptualizations  of how selection/fitness  can cause evolutionary change. Matthen and Ariew (2002) offer 
an argument against the force conception and hold that “[t]he disanalogy [between physics  and evolutionary 
biology] is  that, while force affords Newtonian mechanics the means to compare and add up the 
consequences  of these diverse causes, fitness  does not add up or resolve. This  is why population geneticists 
are forced to estimate fitness  by measuring population change” (68). They support this  position with claims 
like the following:
For example, you might learn that the optimal reproductive strategy with respect to sex determination is 
to produce male offspring when there are fewer males  in the population, and females when there are 
fewer females. But this  only tells you about the relative merits of strategies  within a circumscribed set, 
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with other factors  held constant. The analysis  does  not tell you whether producing offspring of the 
minority sex is  more or less  advantageous  than other fitness-relevant things  you can do; there is, 
generally, no way of combining the effects  of a good strategy in this  game, with good or bad strategies  in 
other games (Matthen and Ariew 2002, 67).
In order to analyze and critique M&A’s  argument, we must first get some sense of what they even mean by 
vector addition and what concept of fitness  they are employing. One clue follows  the above quotation: 
“Suppose a certain species undertakes  parental care, is  resistant to malaria, and is  somewhat weak but very 
quick. How do these fitness factors  add up? We have no idea at all” (67). Here they speak of a “species” but 
presumably they are not talking about species  fitness. It appears  that they are getting at this  point: if we 
endow an individual in a species  with several traits  like resistance to malaria, moderate quickness, etc., we 
have no idea what the net fitness effect would be. Although these traits  may be good for some individuals, 
certain trait combinations may be deleterious.
First, if M&A are simply arguing that to determine the fitness  of an individual organism, one cannot 
always  merely sum the average fitness values of each of the individual’s traits, they are correct because there 
are many cases where there would be systematic errors. For example, for a weak organism the trait of 
boldness  might be fitness  sapping, but for a strong organism boldness  might be fitness  boosting. (And this 
reinforces  the point that T1 is  not, in general, equivalent to T2 or T3.) Though nature abounds  with 
examples  like these, there are good reasons  to think that the situation for biologists  is  not as  grave as  M&A 
suggest. One might argue (contra M&A’s premises) that biologists  are able to do reasonably well at inferring 
fitness  advantages  of suites  of traits  given detailed data on how the traits  affect organisms. Brandon and 
Ramsey (2007) took this  stance against M&A and I will not repeat their arguments. Instead, I would like to 
grant M&A their premises  and see—keeping P1  and the arguments  above in mind—whether their 
conclusion follows.
The key question is  this: if it is  true that one cannot take trait fitness  values  for the traits  of an individual 
organism, sum them, and thereby obtain the fitness  value of the organism, does  this  mean that fitness should 
be understood in a merely statistical way? The answer is  no because vector summation does  not work even 
under the assumption that the causal interpretation (CI) is  a viable interpretation of fitness. The CI, in a 
nutshell, involves the following. Organisms  have fitness  values, and these values are about the propensity of 
producing descendants,8 and an organism’s  fitness  is  causally dependent on (at least some of) the traits  it 
possesses. Natural selection for these traits  occurs  via this  causal dependence, and evolution by natural 
selection will occur when the selected traits  are heritable. This  is the bare-bones  picture of the CI. To flesh 
things  out a bit more and see the implications  for vector addition, let’s  consider in more detail the nature of 
trait fitness  that M&A endorse and what the relationship is  between trait and organismic fitness  under this 
view.
A&E and Sober explicitly endorse T2, but also hold T3; A&E also assume T1. It is  not a problem to 
hold that there are many senses  of trait fitness  and that each of them has  a useful domain. But we have seen 
that their arguments  are undermined by asserting that individual fitness  must simultaneously underwrite 
T1–T3, and that its  failure to do so evinces  deep problems with individual fitness. How do M&A understand 
trait fitness? In their words, “predictive fitness  is  a statistical measure of evolutionary change, the expected 
rate of increase (normalized relative to others) of a gene, a trait, or an organism’s representation in future 
generations” (56). Fitness  for them is  thus  a statistical measure of evolutionary change, and the measure of 
choice is  an expectation value. This  expectation value, projected into the future, is  how M&A get the 
“predictive” in predictive fitness. Thus, if M&A’s conception of trait fitness  is  any of the three conceptions 
described above, it is  a form of T3. If this  is  true, then the important question concerns  the relationship that 
organismic fitness bears to T3 under the CI.
Under the CI, there is  no way to infer T3 from organismic fitness  alone (even if one knew the fitness 
values  of each organism possessing the trait), and that given T3 values  for all of the traits  possessed by the 
organism, one cannot deduce the organism’s  fitness. This  paradoxically seems  to contradict the 
characterization of the CI, which describes  organismic fitness  as  being causally dependent on the traits  the 
organism possesses. The resolution of this  paradox involves  recognizing two things. First, an organism’s 
fitness  is  dependent on its  traits, not (merely or directly) on the T3 values  of its  traits. Second, T3 concerns 
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the change in the representation of traits  in a population. And traits  can spread not just because the 
organism possessing them has  a high fitness, but the traits can achieve their high T3 values  by sacrificing the 
fitness  of the organisms  that possess  them. An organism possessing many virulent diseases  will have more fit 
traits  (sensu T3) than an otherwise identical organism lacking these traits. If one balks  at calling the 
possession of a transmissible disease a “trait” (because it lacks a genetic basis  or is  not inherited), then one 
can consider examples  like the mouse t haplotype. Its  possession is  detrimental to organisms  (it is lethal when 
homozygous), yet it has  spread through the mouse species  Mus musculus via the mechanism of meiotic drive, 
achieving population frequencies as  high as  40% (Morita et al. 1992). This  shows how a high T3 trait can be 
associated with low organismic fitness. High organismic fitness  can also be associated with a low T3. An 
organism might have a high fitness  phenotype because of being an ideal height, say, but if height is a 
polygenic trait (e.g., if it is  a function of several genes  on different chromosomes), then the trait will have 
fairly low T3, since its  spread through the population will be hindered by its  polygenic nature. One 
observation that we can make from this  is that organismic fitness  is  a distinct concept from inheritance, 
whereas T3 depends crucially on inheritance.
Another way to analyze M&A’s  argument is  to identify their “fitness  factors” like parental care and 
resistance to malaria with T1 values. Understood this  way, the T1 values  of these traits  do not provide 
individual fitness  values  because T1≠T2, and they do not provide trait dynamics because T1≠T3. We can 
now see precisely why trait fitness  values  do not add up like Newtonian vectors, as M&A suggest, and that 
this  in no way implies  the truth of the SI or the falsity of the CI. Does this  mean that the statisticalists  are 
wrong and the causalists  are correct? As  we will see, the SI is  largely correct for one conception of fitness, but 
because this  is  distinct from the conception of fitness  that the causalist is  focused on, the SI and CI 
proponents are, to a large degree, arguing past each other.
5. Toward a Truce in the Fitness Wars
Let us  take stock. We have seen that the fitness  of organisms is  not holistic as  suggested by Sober, though 
some conceptions  of trait fitness  are indeed holistic. And Ariew and Ernst offered three criteria that are 
supposed to serve as  desiderata for the causal conception of fitness, but the causalist should not regard these 
as  desiderata. Finally, the fact that trait fitness  values  do not add like vectors serves  neither as  evidence for or 
against the SI. 
What then are the implications  of the above arguments for the SI-CI debates? Is  fitness  a cause of 
evolutionary change or not? The answer is both yes and no. If organismic fitness  is  understood as  a 
probabilistic propensity to produce offspring, then, so long as propensities  are taken to cause their effects, 
organismic fitness  can clearly cause population-level changes  in trait frequencies  (i.e., organismic fitness can 
be a cause of evolutionary dynamics). But organismic fitness  is  limited. If an organism’s  fitness  is  based on its 
propensity to survive and reproduce, then organismic fitness  makes predictions  about the number of 
descendants  an individual is  likely to leave behind, but it does  not imply what traits  the descendants  are 
likely to bear. Thus, one cannot derive trait dynamics  from individual fitness values  alone even if provided 
fitness  values  for each individual in the population, plus  data on which individuals bear which traits. 
Organismic fitness  is thus a cause of evolutionary change, but a limited one. Changes  in population 
structure or size, or changes in mutation rates  or heritability values, can modify trait dynamics  without 
modifying the fitness of  individual organisms.
In order to see more clearly how individual fitness  can be linked with evolution, let’s  begin with an 
idealized population in which all the fitness  concepts  discussed above converge. Consider a population that is 
effectively infinite in size and is  composed of asexual organisms of two types, A and C, which reproduce 
with perfect fidelity. The two types differ with respect to one trait only and the possession of this  trait has  a 
homogeneous  effect on the individuals  bearing it; that is, being an A and being born in one part of the 
population instead of another, or at one moment instead of another, does not affect A’s  fitness. In such a 
population, trait fitness  T1–T3  are equivalent; the fitness  impact of being an A will be directly linked to the 
average fitness  values  of the A’s, which will be directly linked to the expected proportion of A’s  in future 
generations. Thus, in such a case, individual fitness  is directly causally responsible for the changes in the 
proportion of  A’s and C’s in the population (i.e., evolution). 
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It is  easily seen that as  we relax these idealizations  toward the states  of actual populations, there is no 
qualitative break; there is  no point at which organismic fitness suddenly stops mattering for trait fitness. 
What occurs  is  a gradual disassociation of the two: as  the population size reduces, population size will 
increasingly bear on trait dynamics  and weaken the link between trait dynamics  and individual fitness. 
Individual fitness  is  still a cause of evolution in small populations, but such populations  introduce a 
significant intervening factor—census  size—that has  an effect on trait dynamics. Similarly, if trait 
transmission occurs  without perfect fidelity (e.g., A’s  sometimes  produce C’s), then the fitness  that individual 
A’s  have will still bear on the dynamics  of A and C types. It is  merely the case that the fitnesses  of the 
individual A’s and C’s will do a poorer job of predicting future trait dynamics. In the extreme case in which 
each A and C produce either an A or a C with a probability of 0.5, it is  true that individual fitness  will not 
be a good predictor of evolutionary change. But this  is  hardly surprising, since this  would not count as  a case 
of evolution by natural selection.9 Thus, individual trait differences  provide causal explanations for trait 
dynamics  only for systems  undergoing evolution by natural selection, which is  exactly what we would like 
individual fitness to be able to accomplish. 
The CI, or at least one interpretation of it, is  therefore defensible. Does  this mean that the SI is  therefore 
undermined? We have seen that there are a multitude of fitness  concepts in circulation, four of which were 
highlighted (one version of organismic fitness plus  T1–T3), and in order to make statements  like “fitness is 
merely statistical, not causal,” one first needs  to make clear which of these concepts  is  in use. Many of the 
points  that the statisticalists  make do apply to T3. The values of T3 do vary with n and appear to be 
“holistic.” Thus, one might concede that the statisticalists are largely correct regarding T3. But this  does  not 
imply that all conceptions  of fitness  are “merely statistical.” A T3 with some statistical elements  can exist 
alongside a causal conception of  organismic fitness.
6. Conclusion
This paper has  attempted to show that the fitness  of organisms  is  not holistic, and that organismic fitness 
can be understood legitimately as  one of the causes of evolutionary dynamics. But I also have shown that 
there is  a plurality of fitness  concepts  and that both SI and CI arguments, to the extent that they are sound, 
are sound only for a subset of these concepts. One might assert that the fitness  of organisms  is  causal, but 
that fitness  T3 is  (to some degree, at least) statistical and holistic. There is  no contradiction entailed in 
making these assertions. This  implies  the overarching conclusion that the SI and CI proponents  are, to a 
large degree, arguing past each other. Conclusions  about the statistical nature of T3, for example, simply do 
not serve as  evidence for the statistical or holistic nature of organismic fitness. Thus, my hope is  that this 
paper will help to show which of the debates  over the causal status of fitness  are vapid, and which represent 
genuine points of  tension.
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Notes
1. Sober is  using ‘reproductive behavior’ broadly, meaning the reproductive outcomes that individuals  have (or 
probably will have), and not something narrower like mating behavior.  To avoid confusion, I will use the phrase 
‘reproductive outcomes.’
2. For the sake of simplicity, I will henceforth speak of “one individual not causally interacting with another.” But by 
this  I mean that one individual’s reproductive success is in no significant way causally influenced by the presence 
or features of the other individual. There will of course always be some causal link between the individuals, even if 
this is but a slight gravitational attraction.
3. Such an example is not realistic, but this  is the simplest case that is  needed to make this point. More complex 
cases, as can be easily seen, exhibit the same phenomenon.
4. For how expected trait frequencies are calculated, see Sober (2001, 314).
5. Lewens (2010) makes  the case that “[w]e should not expect any good principled answer to the question of which 
elements of some evolutionary process should count among contributors to fitness, hence we should not expect 
any principled account of how we should understand the force of selection” (314). I hope to convince the reader 
otherwise by arguing that there are principled reasons for excluding population size from individual fitness 
determinations, but not from certain conceptions of  trait fitness, like T3.
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6. To draw a close analogy with Sober’s cow example, the A coins  could have a 0 on one side and a 2 on the other, 
the C coins could have a 1 on both sides, and the paybacks for each coin could be two A coins for each “2” and 
one C coin for each “1.”
7. In arguing for a statistical interpretation of fitness,  the statisticalists  often acknowledge the coherence of the 
concept of (causal) organismic fitness,  but they dismiss the theoretical use of such a concept in the theory of 
natural selection. Matthen and Ariew (2002), for example, distinguish “informal fitness” (a causal, individual 
organismic fitness) from “predictive fitness” (a statistical measure of population-level change). Only the latter,  they 
argue, is the theoretically important fitness concept and it is this concept that they discuss and analyze.
8. This is  vague but specifying what, exactly, this means (e.g., what counts as  a descendant) is  well beyond the scope 
of  this paper.
9. Since one of the necessary conditions for evolution by natural selection is the inheritance of traits (Darwin 1859; 
Lewontin 1970).
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